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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
D. L. ATHERLEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
BULLION MONARCH U R AN I U M 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8859 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant to quiet title 
to an unpatented mining claim known as the Poison Frac-
tion. Defendant-respondent in its answer asserted that 
such claim was without any legal or equitable foundation 
and sought by counterclaim to quiet its title to four un-
patented lode mining claims which, it asserted, covered 
all of the area purportedly claimed under the Poison Frac-
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2 
tion location. Subsequently, defendant-respondent moved 
for summary judgment quieting its title as against the 
plaintiff-appellant in and to one of such claims, the Farmer 
John No.3, Mineral Survey 7292, Utah, on which is located 
virtually all of respondent's developed mine. By Mem-
orandum Decision of January 27, 1958, and Judgment of 
February 17, 1958, the court below granted said motion 
for summary judgment. 
The parties will be hereinafter referred to as appellant 
and respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment conceded, 
for the purposes of the motion, that all of the material con-
tentions made by appellant were correct. There is there-
fore no issue between the parties on this appeal as to any 
material fact. The statement of facts contained in appel-
lant's brief, however, is not complete enough to afford the 
Court a full understanding of the questions presented and 
contains lengthy arguments and assertions relating to facts 
already a :lmitted which serve only to confuse the issues. 
Respondent therefore deems it necessary to restate the facts. 
Before doing so, hovvever, respondent desires to call the 
Court's attention to one material misstatement of fact by 
appellant. On p:lge 4 of his brief appellant states that the 
purported movement of the south line of the Farmer John 
No. 3, which was conceded by respondent for the purposes 
of the motion for summary judgment, was made "since 
1952." This is no doubt an inadvertence since appellant 
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3 
states on page 3 of his brief that such movement took place 
between 1943 and 1952. In any event, the record is clear 
that the corners of the claim have remained in their pres-
ent position at least since 1952, three years prior to appel-
lant's first attempt to'locate a mining claim in the area (Tr. 
11, 50). 
All of the facts material to the motion for summary 
judgment and this appeal appear in the pleadings and in 
appellant's deposition of June 17, 1957, published on Oc-
tober 18, 1957, in the hearing on respondent's motion. Ref-
erences to transcript page refer to said deposition. 
The Farmer John No. 3 claim was located in 1943 by 
one James M. Sargent who subsequently conveyed his in-
terest therein to Bullion Monarch Uranium Company, Inc., 
the respondent in this case (Tr. 7, 39-40). The mining of 
uranium from said claim was the first uranium mining 
conducted in the State of Utah (Tr. 36). 
Appellant D. L. Atherley first came on the property 
covered by the Farmer John No. 3 in 1949, six years after 
the location of said claim under the mining laws of the 
United States and the State of Utah (Tr. 3, 35). Appellant 
worked said claim himself, under contract with respondent 
Bullion Monarch Uranium Company, Inc., from 1949 to 
1952 and removed during said period of time some ten 
thousand tons of ore from the area now in dispute ( Tr. 6-7) . 
The Farmer John No. 3 claim was leased in 1954 to 
Vanadium Corporation of America, which company has 
since worked and developed the mine (Tr. 28-29). 
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4 
A·ppellant D. L. Atherley estimates that Three Hundred. 
Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) has been expended by 
respondent and its lessees and contractors in developing 
the area in dispute ( Tr. 44) . 
This litigation arose out of a mining claim named the 
Poison Fraction located by the appellant. Said claim was 
first located in May of 1955 over a small portion of the 
eastern part of the Farmer John No.3 (Tr. 14, 17-21). In 
1956, appellant amended the location of the Poison Fraction 
so that it covered the area presently in dispute as shown 
on respondent's Exhibit "A" to appellant's deposition. Re-
spondent's lessee, Vanadium Corporation of America, was 
conducting mining operations on the area in dispute at the 
time of the location and the amendment of the Poison Frac-
tion by appellant and had been conducting such operations 
for some time previously thereto (Tr. 29). 
The following facts, all admitted by appellant in his 
deposition, are the basis for the motion for summary judg-
ment herein : 
1. Appellant does not contend that respondent or its 
predecessors in interest have ever failed to do the annual 
assessment work required by the mining laws of the United 
States and the State of Utah (Tr. 35). 
2. Appellant acknowledges that the corners of the 
Farmer John No. 3 claim were, at the time of his location 
of the Poison Fraction, in the same position that they had 
been in since 1952, three years before he first attempted 
to locate the Poison Fraction, that such corners (brass cap 
U. S. Mineral Survey monuments, Tr. 11) are still in the 
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5 
same place that they were in in 1952, that he, the appellant, 
knew where said corners were at the time he located and 
amended the Poison Fraction, and that he deliberately 
staked over said corners (Tr. 11, 50). 
3. The Farmer John No. 3 claim, as now staked and 
as it has been staked since 1952, under the admitted facts, 
included within its limits all the area presently in dispute 
(Tr. 49-50). 
4. At the time of the location and amendment of the 
Poison Fraction by appellant, respondent through its lessee 
was in possession of the area in dispute and was conduct-
ing mining operations thereon and had been conducting 
mining operations thereon for some time previously (Tr. 
29). 
5. The area which appellant claims in this case covers 
substantially all of the developed mine on the Farmer John 
No. 3 claim (Tr. 47-48). 
Appellant contends that the Farmer John No. 3 claim 
was located in 1943 in the north 55° east direction shown 
on respondent's Exhibit "A" to appellant's deposition. He 
further contends that, some time prior to 1952, the claim 
was amended or a new location was made so that the boun-
daries thereof coincided with the east-west claim as shown 
on said Exhibit and as claimed by respondent. There is no 
dispute as to the fact that the boundaries as shown by the 
east-west claim were established by the Ogden and Shelton 
Surveys and that said boundaries have been clearly marked 
on the ground since 1952 and that said boundaries have 
represented the claim of respondent since 1952. 
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Appellant further contends that, since the claim was 
originally located as indicated on said Exhibit and since 
no amended or relocation notice has even been placed of 
record in the County Recorder's Office of Piute County, 
respondent cannot now claim and has not legally located 
that portion of the ground lying south and east of the lo-
cation as originally made. Under this theory, appellant in 
1955 and 1956 located the Poison Fraction claim as shown 
on respondent's Exhibit "A" to appellant's deposition. Ap-
pellant contends that the area colored in red on the Exhibit 
was at the time of the location of the Poison Fraction, open 
public domain. This appeal involves the rights in said 
colored portion. 
For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment, 
and hence on this appeal, respondent is willing to concede 
that appellant's contentions are correct. That is, respon-
dent concedes for the purpose of the motion and appeal that 
the Farmer John No. 3 claim was originally located in a 
northeast-southwest direction as shown on Exhibit "A" and 
that, some time prior to 1952, the claim was amended or 
a new location was made in accordance with the claim as 
presently contended for by respondent and that no amended 
or relocation notice was placed of record at the time of said 
purported movement. Assuming said facts to be correct, 
respondent contended below and contends here that appel-
lant cannot recover as a matter of law. 
Briefly stated, the only issue on this appeal is whether 
or not a mining locator, with full knowedge of the claim of 
a prior claimant, may deliberately stake over the boundar-
ies of said prior claimant while the latter is in possession 
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7 
and mining the property claimed, and assert the invalidity 
of the prior claim on the sole ground that, many years be-
fore, the prior claimant had amended or relocated his claim 
without filing of record an amended or relocation certificate. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE LOCATION OF THE CORRECT AND 
VALID SOUTH LINE OF THE FARMER JOHN 
NO. 3 IS NOT A DISPUTED QUESTION OF 
FACT. 
POINT II. 
CONCEDING ALL OF THE MATERIAL FACTS 
CONTENDED FOR BY APPELLANT, APPEL-
LANT CANNOT RECOVER AS A MATTER OF 
LAW FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
(A) Respondent Has, With Respect to the Area 
in Conflict, Performed Every Act Necessary 
to Initiate and Maintain a Right Under the 
Mining Laws as Against Appellant. 
(B) Appellant Had No Standing in 1955 or 1956 
to Initiate a Valid Mining Claim on the 
Area in Conflict. 
(C) Respondent Has Established a Valid Title 
to the Farmer John No. 3 Claim as Against 
Appellant by Reason of the Fact That it and 
its Predecessors in Interest Have Held and 
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8 
Worked Said Claim for a Period in Excess 
of Seven Years. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOCATION OF THE CORRECT AND 
VALID SOUTH LINE OF THE FARMER JOHN 
NO. 3 IS NOT A DISPUTED QUESTION OF 
FACT. 
Point I of appellant's brief is entitled "The Location 
of the Correct and Valid South Line of the Farmer John 
No. 3 is a Disputed Question of Fact." A reading of ap-
pellant's argument under this heading demonstrates clearly 
that there is no disputed question of fact. After stating 
that such an issue exists in his heading, appellant does not 
again refer to the rna tter but argues instead the legal effect 
of the facts as admitted. At no point does he refer to any 
fact concerning which there is a difference between the 
parties. Respondent therefore, except for this brief state-
ment, will likewise devote its argument to the legal issues 
presented. The cases cited by appellant under Point I of 
its brief, which cases deal with the legal issues, will be 
discussed in Point II (A) hereinafter. 
POINT II. 
CONCEDING ALL OF THE MATERIAL FACTS 
CONTENDED FOR BY APPELLANT, APPEL-
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LANT CANNOT RECOVER AS A MATTER OF 
LAW FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
(A) Respondent Has, With Respect to the Area 
in Conflict, Performed Every Act Necessary 
to Initiate and Maintain a Right Under the 
Mining Laws as Against Appellant. 
The grant of mineral lands on the public domain to 
citizens of the United States is contained in and controlled 
by the provisions of the Act of May 10, 1872, 30 U.S. C. A. 
22, et seq. Said law provides the means by which title to 
federal lands are acquired and further provides that loca-
tions made there under shall be made in accordance with 
the local rules or customs of mining districts in which the 
claim is located insofar as the same are applicable and not 
inconsistent with the laws of the United States. It has 
frequently been held that states also may make such rules 
and regulations by statute. There are no local customs or 
mining rules or regulations in force with respect to the 
ground covered by the claim involved in this lawsuit. The 
laws of the State of Utah respecting location will be con-
sidered hereinafter. 
The only requirements imposed by the federal law 
upon the locator of a mining claim on the public domain are 
as follows: 
1. There must be a discovery of mineral within the 
limits of the claim. 
2. The location or claim must be distinctly marked 
on the ground so that its boundarie~ can be readily traced. 
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There is no requirement of posting or recording a lo-
cation notice or certificate. 
The Utah law relating to the location of mining claims 
on the public domain provides no additional requirements 
insofar as the location itself, as distinguished from the 
record of the claim, is concerned. Sections 40-1-1 to 40-1-13, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Said law does provide, how-
ever, that, within thirty days after the location of a claim, 
a copy of the location notice should be filed of record in 
the office of the County Recorder of the county in which 
the claim is located. There is no provision relating to 
amended location notices or providing for the recording 
thereof. 
Let us now consider the requirements of the law in 
relation to acts of respondent Bullion Monarch Uranium 
Company, Inc., with respect to the area in dispute. 
'"fhe first requirement, which has frequently been re-
ferred to by the courts as "the source of the miner's title," 
is that of discovery. There is no contention in the instant 
case that respondent has failed to make a discovery on the 
disputed area. In fact, appellant himself, working the area 
on a contract with respondent, removed ten thousand tons 
of uranium ore therefrom between 1949 and 1952, more 
than three years prior to his first attempt to locate a claim 
over the area. Moreover, Vanadium Corporation of America 
was mining ore from the claim at the very moment that 
appellant located his claim thereon (Tr. 29). 
The second requirement is that of marking the claim 
so that its boundaries can be readily traced. There is no 
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contention that this was not done in the present case. Ap-
pellant admits that the corners of the claims were placed 
in their present positions, so as to cover all of the disputed 
area, at least by 1952 and that they have remained in posi-
tion since that time. He further admits that he was working 
the very area that is now in dispute on a contract with 
respondent from 1949 to 1952 and that he knew respondent 
claimed said area throughout the entire period in question. 
Basically, the only proposition relied on by appellant 
to sustain his attempt to divest respondent of its very val-
uable mining property is that the conflict area was open 
public domain for the sole reason that respondent failed 
to file with the County Recorder a location notice as pro-
vided for by Utah law or an amended location notice. Re-
spondent submits that the failure to record such a notice is 
immaterial in this case for two reasons: 
1. The recording of a notice of location is not requi-
site to the initiation of title under the mining laws, and 
the failure to record such a notice does not forfeit a title 
properly initiated. 
2. Appellant had actual notice of the claim of respon-
dent and hence cannot complaint of the absence of const1"uc-
tive notice. 
For the purpose of this discussion it is important to 
distinguish the location of a mining claim from the record 
of such clair.a. The locator's title to a mining claim under 
the mining laws is initiated by the discovery of mineral 
coupled with the segregation of the claim from the public 
domain by the marking of the boundaries thereof. As was 
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said in Clark-Montana R. Co. v. Butte & Superior Copper 
Co., 233 Fed. 547, affirmed 249 U. S. 12: 
"A location and its record are different things. 
The federal and state statutes distinguish between 
them, and the former even in authorizing local rules 
'governing the location' and 'manner of recording.' 
[30 U. S. C. 28.] The statutory object is to protect 
and reward discoverers of mines. Discovery with 
intent to claim is the principal thing and vests an 
estate-an immediate fixed right of present and 
exclusive enjoyment in the discoverers. The record 
'is incidental machinery to secure to the discoverer 
his reward and to give notice to others. The spirit 
of all recordation acts is notice to protect others 
against secret equities. If the record is not neces-
sary to create the estate (as it is in the matter of 
homestead exemptions and mechanic's liens), the 
statute providing for recording is but a direction to 
do certain acts and does not create conditions subse-
quent; and if the statute provides no forfeiture for 
failure to reeord, by failure the estate is not divested. 
Recordation of mining locations cannot be a condi-
tion precedent, for the estate arises before recorda-
tion is to be perform.ed." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The title to a mining claim is therefore initiated by 
discovery and segregation. An estate immediately vests 
thereon. In the absence of a provision for forfeiture in 
recordation statutes, such statutes do not create conditions 
subsequent to the estate. The Utah law does not provide 
for forfeiture for failure to record. Respondent therefore 
Rubmits that the title initiated by discovery and segrega-
tion of the disputed area continued and was in full forc.e 
and effect when appellant attempted to locate a mining 
claim thereon. 
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Other cases holding that the right to a mining claim 
will not be forfeited by a failure to record a notice of loca-
tion, in the absence of a state statute expressly providing 
for a forfeiture on that ground, are Jupiter Mining Co. v. 
Bodie Consolidated Mining Co., 11 Fed. 666; Dripps v. Alli-
son's Mines Co., 187 Pac. 448; Indiana Nevada Mining Co. 
v. Gold Hills Min. & Mill. Co., 126 Pac. 965; Johnson v. 
Ryan, 86 P. 2d 1040. 
Forfeitures are odious and are not to be implied. 
Even if we assume however, contrary to the law as 
stated, that recorded notice is requisite to the continuing 
validity of a mining claim, appellant herein admits that 
he was fully aware of the location claimed by respondent 
and that respondent was in possession of the claim at the 
very moment when he attempted to initiJte rights thereon. 
Therefore, the requirement of notice was fulfilled, and ap-
pellant is in no position to complain of the failure to record. 
As was stated in Flynn v. Vevelstad, 119 F. Supp. 93, af-
firmed 230 F. 2d 695 : 
"The answer alleges, but only by way of recital, 
that the plaintiff had actual notice of the defen-
dant's claims. Proof of this would have been the 
equivalent of valid record notice. [Citing numerous 
cases.]" (Emphasis supplied.) 
In the Supreme Court's decision in the Butte & Super-
ior Company case, supra, the court commented on a prev-
ious case that considered a similar question as follows : 
"Yosemite Mining Co. v. Emerson was con-
cerned with a regulation of the State of California 
which prescribed the manner of the location of a 
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claim. The regulation had not been conformed to 
and the validity of the location was attacked on that 
ground by a subsequent locator who had had notice 
of the claim, he contending that there was forfeiture 
of it. The contention was rejected and we said, that 
to yield to it would work great injustice and subvert 
the very purpose for which the posting of notices 
was required, which was, we further said, 'to make 
known the purpose of the discoverer to claim title 
to the' claim 'to the extent described and to warn 
others of the prior appropriation.' The comment is 
obviously applicable to the asserted defects in the 
declaratory statement of appellees. It, like the Cali-
fornia requirement, had no other purpose than 'to 
warn others of the prior appropriation' of the claim, 
and such is the principle of constructive notice. It 
-constructive notice-is the law's substitute for ac-
tual notice, and to say that it and actual notice are 
equivalents._ 1uould seem to carry the self-evidence of 
an axiom. Besides, in th:'is case there was unequivo-
cal possession of the Elm Orlu and it is elementary 
tha,t such possession is notice to all the ·'lcorld of the 
possessor's rights thereunde1·. Simons Creek Coal 
Co. v. Do?"an, 142 U. S. 417." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In summary, respondent submits that, with respect to 
the conflict area, it has performed every act required 
to initiate and maintain a valid mining claim as against 
the appellant. Appellant's own statements show that re-
spondent has discovered valuable mineral on such area, that 
it has claimed the same and has segregated the same from 
the public domain since 1952, three years prior to the time 
when appellant attempted to initiate a mining claim thereon, 
and that it has performed the annual assessment work 
thereon for every year since the claim was located. The 
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only deficiency which is admitted by respondent or claimed 
by appellant is the failure to record an amended or reloca-
tion notice. Respondent submits that failure to record 
such a notice does not work a forfeiture of its rights under 
the mining claim and further that appellant by his own 
admissions had full knowledge of the extent and limits of 
the claim of respondent and cannot therefore complain of 
the absence of constructive notice thereof. 
None of the authorities cited by appellant under Point 
I of his brief are in conflict with the propositions set forth 
herein. Indeed, most, if not all, of the cases support re-
spondent's position. For the convenience of the Court, re-
spondent will briefly summarize said cases in the order in 
which they appear in appellant's brief. 
The case of Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 87 Fed. 801, 
177 U. S. 505, is a case similar to the instant case but does 
not stand for the proposition claimed by appellant. In the 
case, the prior locator, before the attachment of any rights 
of the subsequent locator, initiated a new claim by a differ-
ent name on top of his old location, including land not 
previously covered thereby. Because of the fact that the 
second claim had a different name and was regarded by 
the first locator as a separate location, the subsequent lo-
cator contended that the second location was invalid in the 
absence of a showing that the prior location had been aban-
doned. It is noted that there is some apparent merit to 
this contention and that the subsequent locator's position 
in said case is considerably stronger than appellant's posi-
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tion herein. The court, however, had no trouble disposing 
the contentions of the subsequent locator as follows: 
"There is no statute, law, rule, or regulation 
which prevents locators of mining claims from re-
locating their own claim, and including additional 
vacant ground unclaimed by other parties, under a 
different name, and conveying it by the designation 
of the last name." (Emphasis supplied.) 
A fortiori, such an inclusion of additional land could be 
made without a change of name, whether the new location 
be considered an amendment or a relocation. 
Pelican & Dives Min. Co. v. Snodgrass, 12 Pac. 206, is 
not comparable with the instant case since the person claim-
ing prior rights had made no location of a mining claim 
at all but had merely driven a tunnel. Four years later, 
after intervening locators had located the ground, he re-
turned ~ the area and attempted to post a notice and erect 
corner monuments in conflict with the intervening claim. 
Appellant quotes at some length from Snyder, Mines 
and Mining to the effect that some decisions sanction the 
moving of boundary stakes during the period permitted for 
the performance of discovery work, notwithstanding the 
intervention of subsequent locators. This matter has no 
relation to the amendment or relocation of a mining claim 
to include vacant and unappropriated lands such as is in-
volved herein ; and the quoted material in fact implies that 
the locator could certainly move his boundary stakes in the 
absence of intervening locators. 
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The case of Cranford, et al. v. Gibbs, et al., 123 Utah 
447, 260 P. 2d 870, while not in point on the facts, fully 
supports the position of respondent on this appeal. The case 
does not hold that a locator with notice may rely on a re-
corded Notice of Location but, to the contrary, holds that 
where there is a discrepancy between the Notice of Loca-
tion and the claim on the ground, the actual lines of the 
claim on the ground control. Both the Cranford case and 
the section in Morrison's Mining Rights referred to recite 
the general rule that notices of location are to be accorded 
a liberal not a technical construction and that any language 
which will be general notice to subsequent prospectors will 
make a sufficient description. In the instant case, of course, 
appellant had full and complete notice of the claim of re-
spondent. 
The case of M eydenbauer v. Stevens, 78 Fed. 787, cited 
by appellant to sustain the proposition that the recorded 
~otice and the location on the ground must correspond, 
actually holds as follows : 
1. The statute authorizing the location of rmn1ng 
claims on the public domain does not require the 
posting or recordation of a notice of location. 
2. If a notice is recorded which does not accord with 
the location of the claim on the ground, the loca-
tion on the ground will prevail and will determine 
the locus of the claim. 
3. Where a prior locator is in actual possession of the 
ground in dispute and the subsequent locator vio-
lates such possession without color of right or 
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title, the prior locator Is entitled to prevail al-
though his location was defective. 
The Court will note that this case fully sustains the con-
tentions of respondent and, in fact, cites as controlling 
Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 160 U. S. 303, cited 
hereinafter. 
In Hauswirth v. Butcher, 1 Pac. 714, the only issue was 
whether the locator could locate a claim 2,000 feet long 
instead of the maximum of 1,500 feet permitted by statute. 
In Newbill v. Thurston, 4 Pac. 409, the court ruled in 
favor of a subsequent locator where the prior locator had 
not segregated his claim by erecting corner monuments until 
after the acquisition of rights by intervening parties. In 
the instant case, of course, respondent's monuments were 
in place in their present position three years prior to ap-
pellant's first attempt to locate the Poison Fraction. It 
is also noted that the case of Doe v. Waterloo Min. Co., 70 
Fed. 455, next cited by appellant, was a retrial of the New-
bill case in the federal courts. The U. S. Court ofAppeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that the prior locators should 
prevail notwithstanding the failure to erect corner monu-
ments prior to the acquisition of intervening rights, so long 
as said monuments were erected within a reasonable time. 
The cases of Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U. S. 527, and San-
ders v. Noble, 55 Pac. 1037, likewise relate solely to the 
question of whether or not a party can acquire rights as 
against a posted notice of location prior to the time when 
the original locator segregated his claim on the public 
domain by erecting corner monuments. 
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The further quotations from Cranford v. Gibbs, supra, 
are not in conflict with the position contended for by re-
spondent herein. The quotations clearly refer to the effect 
of boundary changes on intervening rights. The case holds 
that priority of location, that is, priority in time, cannot 
be maintained if an amendment amounts to a new and dif-
ferent location. This is clearly the law. If appellant had 
acquired his right to the area in dispute prior to the time 
when the Farmer John No. 3 was purportedly amended 
or relocated, respondent would not be entitled to prevail on 
a motion for summary judgment. It is admitted, however, 
that the amendment or relocation, if made at all, was made 
some three years prior to appellant's first attempt to initiate 
any rights in the disputed area. 
Before closing this portion of respondent's argument, 
it may be well to point out that there can be no question 
as to the right of respondent to amend or relocate its claim 
so as to take in territory not originally claimed so long as 
there are no intervening rights to such territory. We be-
lieve this to be axiomatic. The only litigated cases on this 
point, and all of the cases cited by appellant in relation 
thereto, concern situations where a third party has located 
the area in dispute prior to the amendment or relocation. 
As said in Lindley, Volume 2, Third Edition, Section 396 : 
"There is no statute, law, rule or regulation 
which prevents a locator of a mining claim from 
amending his location and including additional va-
cant ground unclaimed by other parties, or even 
giving to the location a different name." 
See also Section 397, which discusses the matter at length. 
There is, of course, no contention herein that the dis-
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puted ground was not vacant public domain at the time the 
purported change of boundaries was made, and appellant 
himself attempted to initiate no rights therein until several 
years thereafter. 
(B) Appellant Had No Standing in 1955 or 1956 
to Initiate a Valid Mining Claim on the 
Area in Conflict. 
It is well established by a long and distinguished line 
of authorities in virtually all the mineral bearing states 
that a locator, with full knowledge that a particular tract 
of land is claimed by another, may not enter such land for 
the purpose of establishing a mining claim thereon while 
such other person is in possession and working and mining 
the claim. This rule derives from and is an equitable ex-
tension of the often quoted statement that "a mining claim 
cannot be located in trespass" and is applied in situations 
where a subsequent locator attempts to reap the benefits 
of another's labor by resort to the technical niceties of the 
mining laws. 
It should be noted that the rule is applied only in pos-
sessory actions between mining claimants, such as the in-
stant case, and not in those cases \vhere the rights of United 
States or those of persons claiming under nonmineral laws 
are involved. As was stated in Houck v. Jose, 72 F. Supp. 6, 
affirmed 171 F. 2d 211 : 
"No presumptions are indulged in favor of a 
claimant, even in possession, against the United 
States, but as between a locator in possession, and a 
subsequent intruding locator, the law favors the 
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locator who in good faith, occupies mineral lands 
and does improvements on them against the intruder 
who goes on the land which he knows has been lo-
cated, claimed and occupied and tries to oust him. 
(Citing numerous cases.)" 
In the case of M' Intosh v. Price, 121 Fed. 716, the orig-
inal locator had located a claim larger than was permitted 
by law. The court, conceding that the claim was invalid and 
void as to the excess, nevertheless held that a junior locator 
could not enter upon the possession of the prior locator to 
claim the excess. In so holding, the court stated: 
"The policy of the mining laws of the United 
States does not permit a locator to thrust out of 
the possession of his discovery and the pay streak 
of his claim one who has located a placer claim in 
attempted compliance with the mining rules and 
laws, and who is actually engaged in mining upon 
that portion of his claim. A case directly decisive 
of the question in Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining 
Co., 160 U. S. 303, 16 Sup. Ct. 282, 40 L. Ed. 436. 
In that case the Victoria Mining Company was in 
possession of and was engaged in working certain 
mining claims. One of its employees, discovering 
what he conceived to be fatal defects in the location 
notices of the claims, conceived the secret intention 
of taking possession of the property for his own 
benefit, secured the assistance of another, and made 
locations on the ground then occupied by his em-
ployer, set stakes and posted notices, and in the night 
time ousted the mining company from its possession. 
The court held that such an intruder and trespasser 
could not make his wrongdoing successful by assert-
ing a flaw in the title of him against whom the 
wrong had been committed. In Eners v. Boatman 
and Others, 111 U. S. 357, 4 Sup. Ct. 432, 28 L. Ed. 
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454, the Supreme Court, affirming the decision of 
the territorial court of Utah in Eilers v. Boatman, 
3 Utah 167, 2 Pac. 66, held that one cannot locate 
ground on which another is in the actual possession 
under claim and color of right, because such ground 
is not vacant and unoccupied." 
In the Eilers case referred to, the Supreme Court of 
Utah said: 
"It is conceded by the respondents, and is doubt-
less true, that, as between two locators, and as af-
fecting their rights only, one cannot locate ground 
of which the other is in actual possession under claim 
or color of right, because such ground would not 
be vacant and unoccupied." 
The contention of the subsequent locator in the Eilers 
case was that the prior locator had not properly staked his 
claim so as to segregate the same from the public domain. 
In Gerber v. Wheeler, 115 P. 2d 100, (Idaho), without 
even discussing the claimed defects in the prior location, 
the court, after noting that the subsequent locator had 
actual know ledge of the boundaries of the prior claim, said: 
"We recently passed upon a somewhat similar 
question in the case of Independence Placer M. Co. 
v. Hellman, 62 Idaho ... , 109 P. 2d 1038, 1042, and 
said : 'One who has actual notice, that a prior lo-
cator is claiming a tract of mining ground and has 
done location work thereon and continued to do pros-
pecting and assessment work on the property, is not 
in a position to make a valid location on such prop-
erty. In such case he has notice that the ground is 
claimed by another and that so much of it as is 
claimed and occupied is no longer public domain 
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subject to location; and he may not question the 
sufficiency of the original location or the character 
of the original occupant's title.' [Citing cases.]" 
In the case of Brown v. Murphy, 97 P. 2d 281 (Cali-
fornia), the subsequent locator claimed, among other things, 
that there was no proper evidence as to the location of any 
of the prior claims and that there was no evidence that the 
prior claims were staked and marked so that the boundaries 
could be readily traced. The court said : 
"The undisputed findings of the court in the 
instant case are that the respondent was in the actual 
possession and occupancy of the property after the 
discovery of mineral thereon. When the appellant, 
in bad faith, with full knowledge of these facts, and 
without any right or color of title, ousted the re-
spondent, and although if it may be conceded, which 
we do not, that the location under which respondent 
~vas in possession was invalid or defective, still he 
was in actual possession after discovery, which is 
essential to perfect any mineral location, and which 
was the only discovery made under any location. 
The land was not open and unoccupied mineral land 
which warranted the appellant in the face of such 
knovvledge of respondent's actual possession to in-
vade such possession, oust respondent therefrom, 
and under such entry attempt to negotiate a location 
of the property. On the contrary, an intrusion under 
such circumstances by appellant, not in good faith, 
constituted him a naked trespasser who is in no 
position to raise any issue whatever on the question 
of title under which respondent held his possession 
of the property." 
In Ehrhart v. Bowling, 97 P. 2d 1010 (California), the 
contention was that the prior locator had not adequately 
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marked his claim upon the ground. The court, after noting 
that the subsequent locators had often passed the prior 
claims and were well acquainted with them, said : 
"Having this actual knowledge, they could not 
attack the location on technical grounds. It is well 
settled that one who has actual knowledge of the 
claims of another to mineral lands cannot, in good 
faith, relocate the ground because of technical de-
fects in the making of the location [citing numerous 
cases]." 
The same rule was applied, in spite of various claimed 
defects in prior locations, in Pease v. Johnson, 235 P. 2d 
229 (California), Little Sespe Consol. Oil Co. v. Bacigalupi, 
139 Pac. 802 (California), Hayden Hill Consol. Mining Co. 
v. Lincoln Mining Co., 160 P. 2d 468 (Idaho), Steele v. 
Preble, 77 P. 2d 418 (Oregon), Scoggin v. Miller, 189 P. 2d 
677 (Wyoming), Ninemire v. Nelson, 249 Pac. 990 (Wash-
ington). 
The Supreme· Court of Utah has recently had occasion 
to pass on a closely analogous question in Fuller v. Mountain 
Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 842, in which case the 
subsequent locator alleged certain defects in the location 
notice and in the marking of the claim upon the ground. 
The court said : 
"It is further to be observed that the defendants, 
* * * had actual notice that plaintiff claimed 
the area in dispute. Therefore, even if there had 
been deficiencies of a technical nature in plaintiff's 
location, that furnishes no succor to defendants 
* * * in attempting to establish their claim. It 
is well settled that minor defects in the notices, de-
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scriptions, or procedure will not defeat the location 
of a prior claimant at the instance of one having 
actual notice." 
In support of the last statement, the court cited, with 
approval, Steele v. Preble, supra and Independence Placer 
Mining Co. v. Hellman, 109 P. 2d 1038. Portions of the 
opinion in the Hell man case are contained above in the 
quotation from the decision in Gerber v. Wheeler, supra. 
There can be no doubt in this case that appellant was 
fully apprised of respondent's claim and that respondent 
was in possession of the claim and mining therefrom when 
appellant attempted to initiate a claim thereon. Under the 
authorities cited, he was therefore not in good faith and his 
acts were those of a trespasser. 
(C) Respondent Has Established a Valid Title 
to the Farmer John No. 3 Claim as Against 
Appellant by Reason of the Fact That it and 
its Predecessors in Interest Have Held and 
Worked Said Claim for a Period in Excess 
of Seven Years. 
Under the mining laws of the United States, a claim 
to mineral lands on the public domain may be established 
by location and segregation of a portion thereof, as outlined 
in the preceding arguments, or such a claim may be estab-
lished by holding and working a particular mining claim 
for a period equal to the statute of limitations for mining 
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claims of the state in which the claim is situated. Section 
38 of Title 30, U. S. C., provides as follows: 
"Where such person or association, they and 
their grantors, have held and worked their claims 
for a period equal to the time prescribed by the 
statute of limitations for mining claims of the State 
or Territory where the same may be situated, evi-
dence of such possession and working of the claims 
for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right 
to a patent thereto under sections 21-24, 26-30, 33-48, 
50-52, 71-76 of this title, in the absence of any ad-
verse claim ; * * * " 
Some courts at an early date construed this statute to 
be operative only in the absence of a claim by a third party, 
but the Supreme Court of the United States, the final 
arbiter in such matters, has held that if a claim is so held 
and worked the locator's right to a patent is complete and 
is the equivalent of a valid location. In the case of Cole v. 
Ralph, 252 U. S. 286, the Supreme Court said: 
"The only real divergence of the opinion respect-
ing the section [30 U. S. C. 38] has been as to 
whether it is available in an adverse suit, such as 
these are, or is addressed merely to the land depart-
ment. Some of the courts have held it available only 
in proceedings in the department * * * and 
courts in greater number have held in available in 
ad verse suits * * * The latter view has re-
ceived the approval of this court." 
In the instant case, the Farmer John No. 3 claim was 
located in 1943, twelve years prior to appellant's first at-
tempt to initiate a claim in the area. Moreover, there is no 
contention herein that respondent has not performed the 
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assessment work required by federal law to hold a mining 
claim or has not otherwise "held and worked" the claim 
continuously since 1943. In fact, appellant himself estimates 
that $300,000.00 has been expended in the development of 
the claim. 
It is true that respondent is conceding, for the pur-
poses of the motion for summary judgment and this appeal, 
that the boundaries of the claim were changed sometime 
prior to 1952. Since this is so, it could be argued that re-
spondent may not have held and worked the same ground 
for the statutory period. While we have found no cases 
exactly in point, respondent contends that the statute, which 
is remedial in character and designed to protect those who 
in good faith develop mineral lands belonging to the United 
States, was intended to lay at rest all matters relating to 
the original location of a particular claim after the required 
period of time had elapsed. In other words, respondent 
contends that plaintiff at this date is precluded by the 
statute from raising any question as to the original location 
af the claim and, in addition, is precluded from raising any 
question as to the movement of the boundaries thereof, at 
least in the absence of a showing on his part that his rights 
attached to a particula.r portion of the ground prior to the 
movement of the boundaries. The undisputed fact in this 
case is that appellant's rights did not so attach. 
If a litigant in appellant's position were entitled to 
question the efficacy of an original location or the exact 
area covered thereby after the period of limitation had ex-
pired, the purpose of the statute would be thwarted and 
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the benefits inte-nded to be bestowed thereby on those who 
bold and work mineral bearing lands would be illusory. 
Moreover, the law is well settled in this state that, in 
considering whether or not to apply the particular statute 
in question to a given case, the court may consider all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case and the equi-
ties reflected thereby. Springer v. Southern Pac. Co., 67 
Utah 590, 248 Pac. 819. In that case, though conceding the 
lack of a lode discovery by the prior locator, the court said: 
"We cannot conceive of a more flagrant disre-
gard of the rights of one who for nearly a quarter 
of a century has been in the actual, open, visible and 
exclusive possession of mining claim, one who has 
expended thereon many hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, one who has in every respect but one com-
plied with the mining laws * * * than is made 
to appear in this case. Moreover, it is palpably clear 
that the appellants [the subsequent locators] have 
not entered upon the mineral lands in question for 
the purpose of in good faith developing the mineral 
contained therein, but have done so for the sole pur-
pose of dispossessing the respondent and to compel 
it to pay tribute to appellants * * * 
"As a matter of course, the appellants contended 
that the purpose they have in view and the vast 
expenditure of money made by the respondent, are 
wholly immaterial to this controversy. While so far 
as respondent's technical rights in the mineral lands 
are concerned that may be the proper vie'Y to take, 
yet, when the question of the application of a re-
medial statute is to be considered, we think all of 
the facts and circumstances to which reference has 
been made are material and should be given proper 
consideration." 
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In this case, respondent and its predecessors in interest 
have occupied and worked the subject claim for a period 
in excess of fifteen years, have expended vast sums of 
money thereon, and have in good faith developed and uti-
lized the mineral rock contained therein. Respondent sub-
mits that the language of this court quoted above is ap-
plicable to the positions of the parties in the instant case 
and that a court of equity should apply the statute referred 
to and sustain defendant's title on that basis. 
In Point II of his brief filed in this case, appellant 
argues that no sufficient showing has been made to estab-
lish respondent's claim by adverse possession. In addition 
to arguing facts already admitted, appellant makes only 
the single point that respondent has not held and worked 
the particular area now covered by the Farmer John No. 3 
for seven years. As indicated above, if this issue may now 
be raised by appellant, respondent must concede that, under 
the admissions made for the purpose of the motion for 
summary judgment, the argument in this subheading must 
fail. There are, however, no disputed questions of fact 
implicit in the argument as made by respondent herein. 
The cases cited by appellant under Point II of its brief 
do not purport to decide the question which is posed in this 
argument. In the case of Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 
the plaintiff located his claim only a few months prior to 
the time defendant located an adverse claim. Moreover, 
plaintiff did not remain in possession and performed only 
token work on the claim. 
The case of Malone v. Jackson, 137 Fed. 878, is in all 
respects similar to the Meagher case. The prior locator 
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located only a short time before the subsequent locator and 
did not retain possession. 
The case of California Dolomite Company v. Stand-
ridge, 275 P. 2d 823, does hold, as contended by appellant, 
that a subsequent locator may make an issue of fact out of 
whether the prior claim was properly located at the outset 
and whether said claim has been "held and worked" for 
the proper period of time. While the decision is undoubtedly 
correct with respect to the issue of "holding and working," 
respondent submits that it is against the weight of author-
ity with respect to the issues on the original location. This 
Court in fact, in the case of Springer v. Southern Pac. Co., 
supra, has even refused to consider whether or not a proper 
discovery was made after the passage of the period of limi-
tations. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment 
below and hence on this appeal, respondent has conceded 
every material fact contended for by appellant and has 
shown that appellant cannot recover as a matter of law. 
Appellant's claim to the disputed area, while devoid of any 
legal merit, has been and continues to be damaging to re-
spondent company and has impaired the development of 
the mine on the Farmer John No. 3 claim. Respondent sub-
mits that it would be inequitable, in view of the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority on the legal propositions discussed 
herein, to require Respondent to submit to the expense and 
further delay which would be occasioned by a trial of this 
case insofar as the same relates to the Farmer John No. 3 
claim. 
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
DONALD E. SCHWINN, 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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